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Abstract: How should tasks be divided between the EU and its member states? And
what institutional reforms are needed? This paper argues that the single market re-
mains to be better enforced, and this might require further centralisation of tasks. On
the other hand, EU meddling with redistribution should be scaled back; this would
imply reducing EU intervention in agricultural policy, structural funds and the social
charter. EU tasks should instead be expanded outside the first pillar, namely in foreign
and defence policies, internal security, immigration. The paper ends by discussing what
institutional reforms are needed to accompany this allocation of tasks. (JEL F02, F3)
1 Introduction
What tasks should the European Union have, which ones should be left to
Member States? What is the appropriate decision making procedure for the
tasks assigned to the European level of government? In particular, what roles
should be given to the Commission and to the Council? These are some of the
more difficult and pressing questions addressed by the ongoing Convention on
the Future of Europe.
This paper discusses some of these issues from an economic perspective, with
no pretence of completeness. Section 2 summarises the principles of optimal
task allocation implied by the traditional theory of fiscal federalism. Section 3
provides a normative assessment of the current EU situation and formulates
suggestions for how to reallocate tasks. These reallocations raise specific in-
stitution design problems, discussed in Section 4. The paper ends in Section 5
with a discussion of the possible compromises.
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2 Some principles: optimal task allocation in a federation
Which tasks ought to be centralised? This is a classic question in the economic
theory of federalism, addressed by a large literature (for instance Oates, 1999).
Obviously, the EU is not a federation. But since so much has been written on
the theory of fiscal federalism, it is useful to start from here. Neglecting politi-
cal complications (i.e. assuming benevolent governments), the answers sug-
gested by the literature can be summarised as follows.
i) A single market. The central government ought to enforce a well func-
tioning common market, removing all barriers to trade within the federa-
tion. This includes having fixed exchange rates.
ii) Stabilisation policies. Macroeconomic stabilisation policies ought to be
centralised. A common monetary policy is a by-product of fixed exchange
rates. And a common fiscal policy is appropriate to respond to aggregate
shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks could be dealt with by means of local stabili-
sation policies, though this could lead to incentive problems as local gov-
ernments would neglect spillover effects to other localities.
iii) Public goods. Centralising public good provision entails a trade-off. On
the one hand, centralisation implies that spillover effects on other localities
are fully internalised and economies of scale are fully exploited. On the
other hand, decentralisation makes it easier to cope with heterogeneity of
preferences among localities and to exploit local information. Public goods
with large spillover effects (i.e., large external effects on other localities)
and large economies of scale, such as defence, foreign policy, law en-
forcement, ought to be centralised. Public goods where the spillover ef-
fects or the economies of scale are weaker and heterogeneity of prefer-
ences is more likely, such as education, ought to be decentralised.
Note that this trade-off suggests that centralisation is likely to be carried
out further in smaller states, since heterogeneity of preferences is less
likely to be a problem. This in turn also suggests that there might be some
contradictions between the European goals of enlargement and deepening:
a larger Europe increases the relevance of heterogeneity and thus reduces
the desirability of centralisation (Alesina, Angeloni and Etro, 2001 elabo-
rate more on this point).
An important practical issue here is who bears the burden of the proof:
whether the advocates of centralisation or of decentralisation. The “princi-
ple of subsidiarity”, sometimes also called the “principle of decentralisa-Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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tion”, states that the burden of proof stays with the advocates of centrali-
sation.1
iv) Redistribution. Redistribution ought to be centralised. Mobility of tax
bases would otherwise constrain the extent of feasible redistribution. And
income heterogeneity across localities can only be offset through central-
ised redistribution. There is an argument in favour of some element of de-
centralisation, though: decentralisation makes it easier to experiment with
alternative social programs (though in principle a central government too
could experiment).
3 What should the EU be doing?
The EU is not a federation and its political institutions differ in important ways
from those of a representative democracy. Moreover, European citizens do not
have a common identity and are not prepared to accept common policies im-
posed under majority rule as they instead do inside each Member State.  Nev-
ertheless, the previous guidelines are a useful benchmark against which to
contrast the current allocation of tasks in the EU.
But to answer the normative question of optimal task allocation, one has to
move beyond the simplistic view of governments as benevolent social planners
implicit in the prescriptions of Section 2. We have to take into account the
likely political failures at the national and EU level, and more generally the
incentives and constraints of politically motivated governments. This is par-
ticularly relevant in the case of redistributive policies, since redistributive
programs are likely to largely reflect political expediency rather than norma-
tive considerations.
In this Section I consider each of the broad policy areas mentioned above, first
briefly summarising the status quo, and then trying to identify desirable direc-
tions of reform in task allocation.
3.1 The Single Market
Free and undistorted trade between EU member states is one of the over-riding
principle upon which the EU has been built. Tariffs and non tariff barriers on
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goods imported from other Member States are strictly prohibited in the EU,
and the EU already has a common trade policy with regard to the rest of the
world. A single market for goods is already a reality for the EU.
Yet, Member States face continuing temptations to side-step the principle of
free and undistorted trade within the Union, in order to protect domestic pro-
ducers from their EU competitors. Since any tariff can be decomposed into a
consumption tax and a production subsidy, enforcement of free trade inside the
EU requires some constraints on national consumption taxes and on production
subsidies. Local governments must be prevented from imposing higher con-
sumption taxes on goods that are mainly imported from other localities, and
from providing production subsidies and state aids to sectors where foreign
competition is intense. This is one of the important tasks of European compe-
tition policy.
The need for a strong role of the European level of government in implement-
ing the single market is acknowledged by the European Parliament resolution
on the division of competences between the EU and the Member States, Euro-
pean Parliament (2002). In that document, competition policy and the internal
market (including the ‘four freedoms’ and financial services) are correctly
included among the Union’s own competences, on which the Union has strong
and flexible powers while the Member States may intervene only in accor-
dance with the conditions and within the limits established by the Union.
While free trade in goods is a reality inside the EU, this is not yet true for
services. The reason is the persistence of national regulatory barriers. Member
States have regulatory authority over the provision of many services, such as
financial services, public utilities, transportation. Even if national regulation
aims to achieve legitimate national political goals (such as guaranteeing uni-
versal public provision of essential services), it often erects costly or insur-
mountable barriers to trade in services. In many instances, achieving a well
functioning single market in services requires choosing between one of two
alternatives: either accepting the principle of mutual recognition and thus ac-
cepting the competition of producers formally incorporated in other localities
and subject to other regulatory standards; or else, if this would lead to exces-
sive regulatory competition, abandoning national regulation in favour of cen-
tralised regulation at the level of the EU.
But centralising regulation to the EU level or creating new legislation for a
single market in services might conflict with the subsidiarity principle: why
should national governments or legislators be willing to transfer to Brussels
regulatory authority over such delicate areas as energy, banking or telecom-
munications? The dilemma is made worse by enlargement, and the resulting
increase in the number of national legislators or regulators and in the heteroge-Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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neity of goals and specific situations. In these areas there is no easy and gen-
eral solution. The subsidiarity principle might conflict with the goal of creating
a well functioning market for services. If so, priority should be given to the
completion of the single market.
3.2 Stabilisation policies
There is a common monetary policy among the Euro countries. Fiscal policy
for stabilisation purposes remains a national prerogative, but within the con-
straints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, national fiscal
policies are subject to reciprocal screening and monitoring within the EU, not
just to guarantee respect of the Stability Pact, but also to insure a minimum of
co-ordination and the achievement of some common goals (the so called
“broad economic policy guidelines”).
Co-ordination to stabilise aggregate demand
Some commentators have advocated tighter procedures for fiscal policy co-
ordination, to achieve more effective discretional aggregate demand manage-
ment in reaction to EU wide aggregate shocks, or to achieve a better co-
ordination between monetary and fiscal policies inside the Euro area (see for
instance Jacquet and Pisany-Ferry, 2001). But the claim is not convincing, for
two reasons.
First, the evidence suggests that the spillover effects across countries in the
realm of fiscal stabilisation policies are small and unstable (Gros and Hobza,
2001; European Forecasting Network, 2002): on average, fiscal policy in one
country of the Union does not have quantitatively relevant effects in other
Member States. The benefits of fiscal co-ordination are accordingly negligible,
even though things might change if economic integration proceeds further.
Moreover, the possibility of policy co-ordination and communication between
national governments already exists and could be exploited if necessary. A
problem often mentioned is that nobody is currently entitled to speak as Mr.
Euro with sufficient authority and continuity in the event of a currency mis-
alignment. But this is a relatively minor problem, which certainly does not
justify a transfer of powers to Bruxelles.
A second reason is that, even if the spillover effects were sizeable, the benefits of
an active and discretional fiscal policy for stabilisation purposes are highly
doubtful. Evidence by Buti, Franco and Ongena (1997) and in the Commission
report Public Finances in EMU 2001 (European Economy 2001-3) shows that
fiscal policy is often pro-cyclical; Fatas and Milhov (2001) study a large sampleGuido Tabellini
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of countries and show that, when fiscal policy was used discretionally, it tended
to destabilise the economy rather than vice versa. This is not surprising. Fiscal
policy operates with uncertain but considerable lags, and it is very difficult to
time fiscal policy appropriately over the business cycle. Moreover, governments
often engage in “electoral policy cycles”: according to evidence in Persson and
Tabellini (2003), in a large sample of parliamentary democracies taxes are cut by
almost ½ percent of GDP during a typical election year. The ideal arrangement is
one in which national governments mainly rely on “automatic stabilisers”, rather
than on discretional policy decisions. Note that, given the large European welfare
states, automatic stabilisers are quite large in the Euro area (though they differ
across countries). For instance, on the basis of the OECD and Commission esti-
mates, the ECB reports that on average a reduction in the growth rate of GDP of
1 percent implies a worsening of the budget balance by about ½ percent of GDP
on average (ECB Monthly Bulletin, April 2002; see also Public Finances in
EMU 2001 [European Economy 2001-3]).
Overall, the idea that there is a strong role for discretional fiscal policy co-
ordination in Europe is simply without empirical and theoretical foundations
(this conclusion is also stressed by Alesina et al., 2001). On the contrary, theo-
retical work has suggested that fiscal policy co-ordination could even be
counter productive (Vaubel, 1985; Tabellini, 1990). In fact, in the only case
where the Commission has tried to impose a co-ordinated fiscal policy on a
reluctant country, Ireland, its recommendations seemed unnecessary. If the
benefits of policy co-ordination are negligible, decisions on these matters are
better left in the hands of national governments, and there is no need to transfer
sovereignty to the centre.
Co-ordination and the Stability and Growth Pact
There is also a second argument in favour of fiscal policy co-ordination inside
the EU, based not on the alleged benefits of discretional aggregate demand
management, but on the enforcement of the Stability Pact. The argument goes
something as follows. To let the automatic stabilisers work fully, and given the
constraints of the Stability Pact, we need countries to be sufficiently far away
from the 3 percent ceiling on budget deficits, ideally close to budget balance.
Currently this requirement is not satisfied by a number of countries. The EU
should thus have a role in co-ordinating and pushing Member Sates towards
the target of a balanced budget on average over the medium run. Implicitly
motivated by these considerations, in its recent Communication to the Con-
vention (Commission, 2002a), the Commission advocated a strengthening of
its role of agenda setter for macroeconomic policy co-ordination and enforcer
of the Stability Pact. Specifically, the Commission suggests that “the major
economic policy guidelines and the opinions on the stability and convergencePrinciples of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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programmes should be drafted on the basis of proposals by the Commission”
from which the Council could depart only by unanimity – rather than as mere
recommendations that could be abandoned with qualified majority. The Com-
mission would also like to issue direct warnings to the Member States con-
cerned, rather than to submit a recommendation to the Council, which is then
free to adopt it or not by qualified majority.
This argument too is not convincing, although the premise is correct. It is true
that the Stability Pact could inhibit the automatic stabilisers and impart a pro-
cyclical bias to fiscal policy. In principle this need not happen, if governments
are sufficiently farsighted to stay away from the 3 percent ceiling of the Pact.
But will they be farsighted enough? The Stability Pact is needed to discipline
myopic governments. Such governments are likely to remain close to the upper
threshold of 3 percent and will not leave enough margins to absorb cyclical
fluctuations. But if this was the main reason to transfer more discretional
power to Bruxelles over fiscal policy, a simpler solution would be to reformu-
late the budget deficit ceiling in terms of cyclically adjusted budget deficits (in
this case probably lower than 3 percent of GDP). This would allow the cyclical
component of the budget to absorb income fluctuations, even if a country re-
mains close to the ceiling tolerated by the Pact. Indeed, such a formulation
would be an improvement over the current one, precisely because it is less
likely to lead to pro-cyclical fiscal policies.
But there are deeper and more fundamental problems with the Stability Pact.
The Pact has two possible motivations. One is that constraints on national
fiscal policies are needed because of the negative externalities associated with
undisciplined and myopic fiscal policy in some Member States. Excessively
large debts and the risk of financial crisis in some Member States could impose
costs on other Euro-area countries, in the form of higher interest rates or de-
preciated currency. But this externality has obviously little to do with deficits
in excess of 3 percent of GDP. To address the externality, the Stability Pact
should focus much more on longer term indicators of fiscal sustainability, such
as the stock of public debt outstanding and the liabilities implicit in public
pension systems (Pisany-Ferry, 2002, convincingly advocates these kinds of
reforms).
A second possible motivation for the Stability Pact is to correct not an exter-
nality, but a systematic political distortion: fiscal rules and constraints are
needed anyway, because democratically elected governments are myopic and
would otherwise run excessively large budget deficits. It is not obvious that
such a distortion is present in all political systems, though it seems to be more
frequent in the proportional-parliamentary systems that dominate in Continen-Guido Tabellini
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tal Europe.2 But if this is the motivation, again the current formulation of the
Stability Pact is not appropriate. Rather than forcing all countries to give up
fiscal sovereignty to meet the straightjacket of a balanced budget, a more sen-
sible solution would be to try and address the political distortions directly, with
institutional remedies at the national level. This could be achieved in a variety
of ways, for instance through budgetary procedures that increase the bargain-
ing power of the Treasury minister, or imposing stringent requirements on the
transparency and long-run perspective of budget accounts, or relying on the
Commission’s expertise to classify spending and revenues in various catego-
ries, such as capital vs current, or permanent vs transitory sources of revenues,
or to estimate the impact of the business cycle on budgetary accounts (Wy-
plosz, 2002, formulates specific proposals along these lines). Moreover, even
if one were to retain the approach of the Stability Pact, of targeting specific
policy outcomes, the emphasis on the budget deficits and the neglect of the
longer term generational imbalances is not justified. For instance, consider a
pension reform that gradually but permanently reduces pension outlays in the
future, but immediately cuts social security contributions so as to relax politi-
cal constraints. A transition from a pay-as-you-go towards a fully funded pri-
vate pension system could have this effect. Such a reform could run against the
Stability Pact as currently formulated, no matter how desirable from an eco-
nomic point of view. Similar criticisms apply to the current neglect of the
composition of outlays spending into current and capital spending.
Before strengthening role of the Commission as a guardian of the Stability
Pact, these problematic aspects of the Pact should be improved. Otherwise, it
would be easy for recalcitrant governments to criticise the Commission for
forcing them to comply with inefficient and defective rules. But even with
these reformulations, enforcement of the Stability Pact would remain a com-
plex exercise that cannot be carried out automatically. Some escape clauses,
exercised through discretionary collective decision making as in the current
framework, may offset the unavoidable distortions of the Stability Pact for-
mulations.
Summary
The upshot of this discussion is that there is no need to increase the degree of
centralisation of fiscal policy. The benefits of co-ordinated aggregate demand
management are small. The primary emphasis should be to let automatic fiscal
policy stabilisers work. For this purpose, reforms of the Stability Pact are
                                                          
2 This is what emerges from the empirical study by Persson and Tabellini (2003), linking con-
stitutional features to various aspects of fiscal policy in a large sample of democracies.Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 49, 1/2003 83
needed. Giving the Commission a stronger role in enforcing the Pact as cur-
rently formulated would be counter-productive. Member States would feel
deprived of a valuable policy instrument, in the name of an institution that
makes little economic sense.
3.3 Public goods
Very few public goods are centrally provided in the EU. Despite some recent
efforts at co-ordination, defence, foreign policy and internal security are largely
national tasks. So is public transportation. There is some centralisation of tasks in
education, research and culture and in environmental policies, but they amount
to small thing. Immigration policy and border patrols are also decentralised.
More or less centralisation?
From the perspective of cost and benefit analysis, it seems likely that there
would be large payoffs to more central provision of public goods in the areas
of internal security, border patrols, immigration policy, and for aspects of
foreign and defence policy. The abolition of borders between EU countries
carries with it the need to centralise aspects of law enforcement against organ-
ised crime. Moreover, the recent terrorist attacks have made it absolutely clear
that the challenges in these areas are global and require a co-ordinated Euro-
pean response. In terms of the language used in the previous section, the posi-
tive spillover effects and the economies of scale for foreign and defence pol-
icy, internal security, border patrols and immigration policy are very large. At
the same time, the heterogeneity of preferences across countries in these areas
does not seem very acute, at least relative to that present within each country.
This point is confirmed by the recent Eurobarometer surveys depicted in Fig-
ures 1 and 2. About 73 percent of EU citizens want a common defence and
security policy, over 65 percent want a common foreign policy. This should be
contrasted with a rather lukewarm support for EU membership (about 50 per-
cent) inside the EU15. Citizens in the 13 candidate countries display similar
opinions, though their support for EU membership is stronger. The support for
joint decision making in the fight against international terrorism, organised
crime, drugs, is even stronger: around 70-80 percent in both the EU15 and the
13 candidate countries (AC13).3
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Naturally, these opinion polls could overstate the degree of preference homo-
geneity, particularly for defence and foreign policy. They suggest that the vast
majority of EU citizens would support having a common policy, but they don’t
say whether they would really like the same policy. In practice, the absence of
solid political and historical ties among people of different nationalities ad-
vises in favour of caution and gradualism, since the tolerance for differences of
opinion and the desire of accepting the wishes of the majority in the realm of
foreign and defence policy could be much lower than within nations. Never-
theless, compared to the status quo of virtually no integration in these policy
areas, more transfer of sovereignty towards the centre is clearly desirable.
In the case of the other public goods (education, culture, research, health, transports),
the perceived benefits from central provision seem much smaller. On the one hand,
heterogeneity of tastes is more important and local information is more relevant. On the
other hand, economies of scale and positive spillover effects across countries are much
less obvious. The case for central provision of these other public goods is accordingly
weaker and the status quo is likely to be adequate. By the way, in many cases this is
also the opinion of most citizens as revealed by the Eurobarometer surveys.
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Instruments of centralisation
What are the instruments for centrally providing public goods in the areas of
defence, foreign policy and internal security? Certainly, we should get rid of
the illusion that co-ordination between national governments would be enough.
The general reason is that, as with all public goods, individual Member States
have strong incentives to free ride. Central public good provision must be
enforced, and mere policy co-ordination might be non-enforceable. To achieve
effective public good provision in the areas of internal or external security, or
foreign policy, there is no alternative but to delegate executive authority to a
central European policymaker. I now discuss several more specific arguments
that support this conclusion.
First, foreign policy, defence, security, border patrol, are all areas that concern
the executive powers of governments. We are not talking about enacting some
common piece of legislation, or exploiting the rule of law to abide by common
rules. Policies in these areas concern specific executive actions that cannot be
legislated, but entail discretional decisions. It is difficult to imagine how co-
ordination over these discretional decisions can be effectively enforced. This is
an important difference with respect to, say, agreements to enact non-
discriminatory legislation in labour markets or consumer protection, where
verifiability is not a problem and the Court of Justice or the Commission has
effective enforcement power.
Figure 2
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A second related difficulty is that policies in these areas are chosen by gov-
ernments but often executed by specific bureaucracies: the military, a diplo-
matic corps, a border or police patrol. The EU currently does not have a bu-
reaucracy that could execute such common policies. In other areas, where co-
ordination exploits the rule of law, the EU relies on national bureaucracies. But
given the discretional and unverifiable nature of actions in the domain of for-
eign or security policy, it may be difficult to enact a common policy without a
proper EU bureaucracy. Take the example of border patrols. Now each mem-
ber state decides how many resources to devote to this task. This implies a big
free rider problem: why should Italy spend a lot of money and energy to patrol
its borders if illegal immigrants who enter Italy are then likely to move to
Germany or the Netherlands? Agreeing to common guidelines and tight immi-
gration standards among the EU 15 is useless in these areas, as long as en-
forcement is left to unverifiable efforts of national bureaucracies. Enlargement
will make the problem worse: the incentive to free ride on the others increases
with the number of countries. Similar considerations apply to foreign policy.
Developing an EU diplomatic corps is a first step towards having an effective
European foreign policy. But here, diplomats of Members States often com-
pete among each other to promote national exporters, and the Commission is
almost useless. Thus, it is difficult to exploit the traditional vertical links be-
tween the Commission and national bureaucracies that instead have worked so
well in other policy dimensions.
National politics further aggravates these difficulties. This is particularly evi-
dent in foreign policy. As shown above, European citizens are well aware of
the need of a common European foreign policy. But when they judge their own
government, they inevitably do it with the lenses of their own national inter-
ests. It would be foolish to do otherwise: only Italians vote to re-elect the Ital-
ian government; why should they worry about whether the Italian government
actions were also beneficial to the French citizens? But if the mandate of na-
tional governments is to pursue the national interest, their perspective is dis-
torted. National governments will always have a strong incentive to differenti-
ate their own position from the rest of Europe, or to claim credit for individual
success. But if everyone tries to bring “trophies” to show his voters at home, a
common co-ordinated position is unsustainable.
The upshot of all of this is that, to achieve effective public good provision in
the areas of foreign policy, internal and external security, immigration policy,
one needs a specific set of instruments at the European level. While the exact
nature of the instruments depends on the specific policy area, some general
conclusions seem clear.
First, the executive powers of government in specific areas should be trans-
ferred to a EU policymaker that will have discretionary authority within somePrinciples of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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limits. Commercial policy is a good example of how this could be done: one
Commissioner is delegated to negotiate trade policy with the rest of the world,
within pre-established limits. National governments are prevented from taking
part in these direct negotiations, even though they exercise some collective
control over the trade commissioner. More generally, delegation could be to a
member of the Commission, as in the case of trade policy, so that the tradi-
tional “Community method” can be exploited; or it could be to a representative
of the Council – the so called “intergovernmental method”. There is increasing
agreement now that something like this must be done in the area of foreign
policy. The main issue is whether delegation of executive authority should be
to the Commission or to a representative of the Council.
A second related conclusion, relevant for aspects of foreign policy, is the need
to appoint a single external representative for Europe in international organi-
sations (the IMF, the World Bank, perhaps eventually also the UN), replacing
national representatives. Obviously this would increase the influence of the EU
in these organisations. The board of directors of the IMF is a good example.
The executive directors representing the European states are often unable or
unwilling to co-ordinate on a common position. One reason is that they are
delegates of their own economics ministers and feel no strong need to seek a
common position with the other European representatives. Another reason is
that some European directors also represent other non-European countries. But
whatever the reason, the result is that the IMF is often dominated by the US,
even though the US has less votes than the EU 15 together.
Third, there would be benefits from creating an EU bureaucracy in charge of
specific missions, or at least creating a network of national bureaucracies:
increasing the size of the EU diplomatic corps, creating a European border
patrol, units of a European police, perhaps even special EU military troops to
be deployed in special circumstances. These EU bureaucracies could stem out
of national bureaucracies, but their efficiency would be greatly enhanced if
they were accountable and take orders directly from the relevant EU policy-
maker in charge of the specific policy area, thus overcoming the free rider
problem mentioned above.
Finally, creating these instruments and paying for the provisions of these pub-
lic goods would cost money. There is also a growing need for contingency
funds to assist a common foreign and security policy in the event of sudden
crisis. Currently, these public goods are financed by national budgets. This is
highly inefficient: each member state has a strong incentive to “free ride” on
the others and under-provide the public goods that benefit all. The natural
solution is to bear the costs of public good provision out of the EU budget.
Only then, the decision process is forced to internalise all the benefits. The
financial aspect is particularly important in the case of defence, the more costlyGuido Tabellini
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of these public goods. We are well aware of the widening gap between the
military capabilities of the US and the EU. The gap also reflects differences of
financial resources. The amount spent on defence by the European countries
together is less than half of the amount spent by the US. If we take R&D
spending on defence, the gap is even larger: Europe spends only about one
fifth of what the US spends. The gap is widening, and it has reached the point
where European countries are no longer even capable of co-operating with the
US in military operations. Again, this reflects a free rider problem. Why
should Spain spend on defence, if it can free ride on the UK?
But it is not only free riding. There are also important economies of scale that
could be exploited much more effectively. Each individual European state is
fully aware that it cannot have a military and strategic role on a global scale, it
is just too small. Hence the perceived benefits of spending in defence and
foreign policy are limited. But combining the resources of the EU 15 together,
the perspective could be very different. The EU could have a role to play,
imposing its vision and defending its interests, rather than always accepting the
dominance of the US on strategic global matters. Economies of scale could be
exploited even further with enlargement: once countries in Central and Eastern
Europe have joined, the population of the European Union will reach half a
billion. With or without a defence capacity, the Union is bound to have a large
impact on the outside world.
3.4 Redistribution
Redistributive policies remain fully in the hands of national governments.
There are nevertheless three important aspects of current EU policies that di-
rectly or indirectly hinge on redistribution.
Structural and Cohesion Funds. They are transfers from the EU budget to poor
regions in Europe. Eligible recipients are national governments (for Cohesion
Funds) and individuals in poor regions (for Structural Funds). They are negligi-
ble as a fraction of EU aggregate income, but very large for some of the receiv-
ing regions. They are also a large fraction of the EU budget (over one third).
The official goal of these programs is to foster economic convergence of the
poor regions that might be hurt by closer economic integration. But careful
empirical studies have shown that, on average, structural and cohesion funds
have not influenced economic performance: from a statistical point of view,
recipient regions have had the same growth rate (or the same unemployment
rate) as the rest of the sample − see Boldrin and Canova (2001). There are
some success stories in the use of Structural Funds, but there are also some
utter failures. One can always claim that there are special reasons that canPrinciples of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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explain the failures (many of them concentrated in the Italian Mezzogiorno).
But the opposite argument can also be made: some of the success stories, such
as Ireland, are special too. If the goal of these programs was to accelerate eco-
nomic convergence of poor regions, on average this goal has been missed
More likely, the main goal of structural and cohesion funds was redistributive:
not to increase economic efficiency, but to redistribute the benefits of integra-
tion among countries. Two redistributive purposes were prominent: to provide
side payments so as to facilitate compromise in bargaining situations, and to
achieve some redistribution from rich to poor countries or regions – see Pindor
(2001). The question is whether the same goals could have been achieved in
less distorting ways.
Consider first side payments to smooth negotiations and facilitate Pareto im-
proving deals. Participants at the bargaining table are countries, not regions.
Side payments are thus needed among countries, not among regions or groups
of individuals. Given the already high tax distortions throughout the EU, the
value of government revenues is extremely high. This suggests that the most
efficient way to transfer funds among countries is by means of lump sum inter-
governmental transfers across EU governments with no conditions attached,
pretty much as currently done with cohesion funds (but not with Structural
Funds). Tying such funds to specific uses, or trying to identify from the centre
who are the most worthy recipients, is likely to add inefficiencies. If national
governments need to buy consensus at home to promote European integration
(eg., building infrastructure in poor regions), they can find efficient ways to do
that without any constraint imposed by the EU.4
Similar arguments apply if the primary purpose of redistribution is to equalise
incomes. Here too, there is no reason why redistribution should take the form
of direct transfers to individuals, while inter-governmental transfers seem
simpler and more efficient. The political institutions of the EU are probably
less able than those of Member States to cope with the stress of redistributive
struggles. Moreover, the legitimacy and acceptability of redistribution in fa-
vour of citizens of other Members States is limited, compared to the sense of
mutual solidarity inside each nation. Finally, the criteria that should inspire EU
wide redistribution directed to individuals are not at all clear. Why should
funds be targeted to poor regions, and not to poor urban areas? And why not to
areas that are undergoing economic restructuring or areas hit by unexpected
                                                          
4 An example of an inefficiency induced by Bruxelles is the recent Commission’s proposal to
use Structural Funds to subsidize broadband deployment in rural and remote areas. This idea is
a big bonus for the cash stripped telecom industry, but has little economic rationale. There is no
evidence that market forces are unable to develop internet infrastructures where needed. Rather
that spending taxpayers’ money to help ailing industries, the Commission should instead force
governments to develop competitive access to networks through deregulation.Guido Tabellini
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calamities (a flood, an earthquake)? Raising these questions makes it evident
that they should not be answered at the European level. All Member States
have well functioning political systems and a variety of redistributive instru-
ments at their disposal. It is up to them to decide how, to whom and how much
to redistribute. In this case, the prescriptions of the theory of fiscal federalism,
that redistribution ought to be centralised, seem inapplicable, at least in the
near future. Of course, these arguments do not rule out redistribution from rich
to poor Member States for the purpose of equalising the average per capita
income of Member States, leaving redistribution inside each Member State a
national prerogative. The purpose of achieving some income equalisation in-
side the Union could still be achieved, by calibrating the net inter-
governmental transfers on Member States average per capita income.
The imminent enlargement adds further reasons to scale down or reconsider
the “acquis communautaire” on Structural Funds. On the one hand, many resi-
dents of the poor regions in the EU 15 will be deprived of Structural Funds and
will cry for help. Several poor regions of the EU 15 will no longer be recipi-
ents of Structural Funds, because the funds will be reallocated to the poorer
new entrants. According to the Commission, as many as 37 million people live
in regions of the EU 15 that will lose the eligibility status for Structural Funds
once the Union grows to 25 Member States (Commission, 2002b). As a result,
Structural Funds will become much more concentrated among a few regions of
the 15 existing Member States. Swallowing this “withdrawal crisis” without
political tensions and without increasing the budget devoted to Structural
Funds could be difficult.
On the other hand, recipients of Structural Funds in the new Member States are
likely to feel cheated and disappointed. To limit the redistributive flows in
favour of the new and much poorer Member States, it has already been agreed
that total transfers received cannot exceed 4 percent of national GDP for any
country (somewhat hypocritically, the Commission refers to the ceiling as
reflecting limits in the “absorptive capacity” of the new entrants, rather than
the reluctance of richer Member States to open the purse – Commission,
2002b). While 4 percent is a relatively large fraction of GDP, aid will be di-
luted over a very large population, since whole countries will qualify as poor
regions. As a result, the per capita transfers among the poor regions of the new
Member States will be much smaller than in the existing Member States
(where instead transfers are concentrated in just a few regions). Will the citi-
zens of Central and Eastern Europe accept this, or will they feel that their ex-
pectations have been betrayed? The latter outcome is quite possible. Politicians
in these countries have probably over-sold the economic benefits from joining
the EU. The Eurobarometer surveys show that citizens in Central and Eastern
Europe already have very high expectations of drawing economic benefitsPrinciples of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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from EU accession. These expectations are likely to be disappointed, at least in
the short term.
All of this suggests that Structural Funds, far from being an instrument of
solidarity with which to diffuse tensions between rich and poor, are likely to
become a new source of political complaints and disappointments once en-
largement takes place. So far, radical reform of Structural Funds has been
discouraged by the simplistic argument that they are part of the Acquis Com-
munautaire, and as such they are almost sacred (Commission, 2002a). But now
is the time to think more boldly. A simple solution would be to scrap Structural
Funds entirely among the current EU 15 countries, re-inventing them from
scratch on an East-West basis only and on the basis of transfers to countries,
not regions.
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP.) This is a large and complex set of policies
that indirectly or directly transfers income to the agricultural sector and ab-
sorbs almost half of the EU budget. These policies have been reformed repeat-
edly, and the process of reform is still ongoing.
There is unanimity among economists that reforms in this area should be ac-
celerated and completed, transforming CAP from a price fixing to an income
support program for farmers, so as to remove the distorting effects and the
inefficiencies of price controls. Once this transformation is achieved, there is
no longer a valid reason to keep CAP a special EU competence. Income sup-
port to farmers could be more effectively carried out by national governments,
respecting the guidelines of the Single Market to avoid distorting competition.
To the extent that some countries are net losers or net gainers in the reform
process, appropriate compensation can be found through intergovernmental
transfers. Here too, of course, enlargement adds urgency to this problem.
Social Charter  It is widely believed that closer integration and more intense
economic competition threatens the survival of the European welfare state and
would reduce assistance to the poor and to those in need. Hence the need for
policies that impose a minimum level of social protection, or seek to harmo-
nise aspects of labour market legislation, so as to avoid “social dumping” and a
“race to the bottom”.
But the idea that the European welfare state is threatened has little empirical
support. The process of European economic integration has not led to any
dismantling of the welfare states so far, on the contrary. Some of the European
countries that are more open and, by international standards, more competitive,
are typically those of Northern Europe, where the welfare state is larger, more
pervasive, and more geared towards assisting the poor. By contrast, the coun-
tries in Southern Europe have both smaller and more corporatist welfare states,
and much lower ranking in all statistics of international competitiveness.Guido Tabellini
92 CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 49, 1/2003
Clearly, market pressures force all countries to become more efficient. But the
idea that this would lead to a dismantling of the European welfare states is a
conjecture not born out by the facts.
Still, it is true that stronger market forces and more intense competition impose
limits on what governments can do. This is why national governments are keen
to agree to harmonise aspects of social policies, restricting competition in
specific areas. But often, the goal of these restrictions and efforts at harmoni-
sation is to preserve privileges of powerful special interests, not so much to
protect the poor or the weak. If social policy and labour market legislation was
enacted by benevolent social planners, harmonisation and limits to “social
dumping” could indeed be desirable. But such is not the case. The European
unemployment and its low rate of growth are primarily a political problem, not
an economic problem. They are caused by labour market rigidities and high
taxes on labour income, often imposed by powerful trade unions representing
“insiders”, workers close to retirement or even pension recipients. If more
intense competition leads to a dismantling of such rigidities, Europe as a whole
can only benefit. But we should be aware that special interests and opportunis-
tic politicians will try to resist this competition of regulatory systems, impos-
ing harmonisation and minimum standards even if this runs against the general
interest. The risk of excessive centralisation in this area is considerable.
Some co-ordination of EU social policies may still be desirable, however, to
reinforce benchmarking. Citizens are generally well aware of the unsustain-
ability of pension systems in the face of an aging population, and of the ineffi-
ciencies of some aspects of labour market legislation. There is agreement on
the need and the urgency of reforms. But there is disagreement over how to
reform, and procrastination is tempting. Reforms abroad often spur reforms at
home: they put pressures on hesitant governments and provide information on
which reforms work and which do not. Hence, some elements of benchmark-
ing and some common goals can help in the current circumstances. This can be
achieved through efforts at what is now called “Open Co-ordination Method”,
without any transfer of sovereignty to the EU – see Micossi (2002) for an ex-
tensive review of alternative co-ordination methods in the EU.
Summary
This discussion leads me to the conclusion that the role of the EU in the realm
of redistribution should be decisively scaled back. With regards to national
social policy, the EU should avoid efforts at harmonisation. And direct redis-
tribution by the EU should mainly be confined to transfers across national
governments, largely on an East-West basis to smooth the accession process.
The primary role of such transfers should be to make sure that the benefit ofPrinciples of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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European integration are spread fairly among countries. Fairness in integration
is a prerequisite for smooth decision making and efficient bargaining among
countries. But such fairness does not require redistribution to sectors, groups or
regions within countries. National governments have enough tools at their
disposal to achieve their desired domestic redistributive goals, without being
forced to channel funds to specific groups of beneficiaries.
3.5 The budget of the EU
Currently the EU budget is mainly devoted to finance the redistributive pro-
grams of the EU. Out of a budget which is just over 1 percent of the Union
GDP, almost half is spent to support agriculture, while another 35 percent are
transfers to poor regions. Marginal revenues take the form of transfers from
Member States.
Both features give the EU budget a strong redistributive focus. Now the whole
discussion on the EU budget only concerns who gains and who loses, and in
particular which countries are net beneficiaries or net payers, and by how
much. No attention is paid as to whether the money is well spent for the aver-
age European tax payer, or whether reallocations across alternative programs
are desirable. Enlargement, with the large disparities between rich and poor
countries, will make the political debate on the EU budget a nightmare.
In light of the discussion in the previous two sub-sections, it would make much
more sense to shift the focus on what is the appropriate level of public good
provision, taking into account the cost of raising funds. On the side of outlays,
this means spending for the public goods that are currently badly needed: in-
ternal and external security, defence, foreign policy. On the contrary, the re-
distributive programs currently alive should be scrapped, scaled back or iso-
lated in a separate section of the budget.
On the revenue side, these public goods could be financed with the proceeds of
a European tax levied for the purpose. For instance, a fraction of the personal
income tax base, or of the value added tax base, could be reserved for a spe-
cific EU tax. In a way, this would be a return to the past: until 1988 the EU
budget was paid for by a small fraction of the VAT tax. The tax rate on the
agreed upon tax base could be set by the Council and the European Parliament
under some qualified majority provision − see Goulard and Nava (2002) for a
more extensive discussion of how this could be done in practice.
Such a financial arrangement would have several advantages. It would focus
the mind of politicians on what is the appropriate level of public good provi-
sion, rather than on who can bring home bigger trophies to show to his voters.Guido Tabellini
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Giving the European Parliament more say over the budget, and creating a spe-
cific tax over which the European Parliament has some control, would also
stimulate a European-wide debate on genuine European policy issues: how
much are we prepared to spend to have a more effective military capability, or
a more efficient border patrol? Now, political debates on these issues are in-
evitably distorted by a national perspective and by the debate on redistribution
across countries. Finally, having a European tax earmarked for concrete and
specific European public goods would increase the transparency and legiti-
macy of EU decisions on those matters.
This idea, of providing specific European public goods in the realm of secu-
rity, defence and foreign policy, out of a common EU budget financed by a
specific European tax, is quickly gaining ground in several circles. The recent
Communication of the Commission to the Convention (Commission, 2002a)
implicitly formulates a proposal of this kind. But this idea, as sound as it is,
stumbles against an important objection. How do we know that a European tax
will not be abused to finance redistributive transfers that disproportionately
benefit some groups or some countries? After all, this is exactly what the EU
budget is currently being used for.
In principle, this could be prevented by earmarking the tax proceeds for spe-
cific public goods, and prohibiting their use for redistributive purposes. Redis-
tributive programs could still be financed by means of transfers from Member
States. But the promise that the proceeds of a European tax will not be diverted
for redistribution would be much more credible if the purely redistributive
programs of the EU budget (CAP and Structural Funds) were scaled down or
deeply reformed. As argued above, these programs are inefficient and deserve
to be reformed anyway, particularly in view of the imminent enlargement. But
there is an additional argument to do so with urgency. Their mere existence in
the current form raises legitimate suspicion on how the EU budget would be
spent if more resources were available. Thus, these programs are a political
obstacle to the creation of a more efficient system of providing and financing
badly needed European public goods.
4 The Commission vs the Council: who should be doing what?
The task reallocations discussed in the previous section and the imminent
enlargement have important implications for how to reform the EU institu-
tions. Centralisation of new tasks and the entry of several new Member States
may require the creation of new institutions, or the reform of existing ones.
This section discusses some important tradeoffs in institution design. Given the
complexity of these issues, there is no pretence of completeness.Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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4.1 Bureaucratic accountability and democratic accountability
One reason why EU integration has been so successful is that centralisation
has meant much more than simple policy co-ordination. It has meant designing
institutions that make it possible to transfer sovereignty to the centre. Integra-
tion has proceeded gradually, one policy dimension at a time, tailoring the
institution to the specific policy area over which integration was needed.
A remarkable feature of EU integration so far is that centralisation has pre-
served important dimensions of accountability and control. But it is important
to appreciate the particular way in which accountability for EU decisions has
been preserved, and how it differs from political accountability in representa-
tive democracy.
In a representative democracy, elections are the ultimate instrument for hold-
ing politicians accountable. Citizens delegate decisions to representatives
(governments, legislators). If they are not satisfied with the decisions taken,
the delegation is not renewed: the majority loses the elections and is replaced
by a new government or a new majority in Parliament.
This mechanism cannot work in the EU, at least not under the current Euro-
pean constitution. Governments are the key decision makers in the Council.
But they are accountable to citizens at home, in national elections, and they are
primarily judged for their domestic performance, not for EU decisions. And
other EU policymakers (the European Central Bank or the Commission) are
appointed, not elected.
Accountability in the EU has been achieved, instead, through methods that are
typical of bureaucratic control, not of political control. Transfer of power to a
EU body has generally been accompanied by a clear operational definition of
the policy goals. EU policymakers (the ECB, the Commission, the majority in
the Council) generally have a narrowly defined “mission”: price stability, en-
forcing the single market, holding prices of agricultural commodities stable.
This has two advantages. On the one hand, it limits discretion by the EU poli-
cymakers, and hence insures that power transferred is not abused. On the other
hand, it facilitates ex post control. The European Parliament, the media, the
Council, can blame or approve the way in which EU decision making power
has been used. Since EU policymakers have a narrow mandate and their deci-
sions are often inspired by external technical criteria, they can be held ac-
countable for their behaviour despite the absence of elections.
This method of bureaucratic control has worked well so far in the EU. Proba-
bly, it can be fruitfully extended to the realms of immigration policy or internal
security. Here, it seems possible to define a precise mission for EU policymak-Guido Tabellini
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ers, exploiting the Commission and designing appropriate technical guidelines
to achieve clearly defined operational goals.
But can the method of bureaucratic control also work in the other new areas
where further centralisation is most urgently needed, foreign policy and de-
fence? It seems very unlikely. As argued above, here a transfer of executive
powers with open ended and discretional decision making is really needed.
What mandate can be given in the realm of foreign policy? The only feasible
mandate is to pursue the common interest of the EU. But what does that mean
in practice? If the mandate is so incomplete and it leaves so much room for
discretional judgement, there is only one way to hold policymakers account-
able: through democratic elections. Only citizens can tell whether policy deci-
sions are really in their own interest. Unfortunately, as argued above, this in-
strument of control is unavailable at the EU level, or at least it is seriously
deficient.
4.2 The Intergovernmental method vs the Community method
We are thus left with a fundamental problem. Europe is now in a situation in
which there would be major benefits in centralising foreign policy and de-
fence. But in this policy area, bureaucratic control cannot work. To centralise
aspects of these policies, a drastic redesign of the EU political constitution
might be needed. Europe might need political institutions that are more typical
of a federation than of a confederation of states. It is no coincidence that his-
torical episodes of unification of countries have indeed coincided with situa-
tions in which external threats or a common enemy created large benefits from
centralising defence and foreign policy. But is Europe ready to jump to much
closer forms of political integration? And if the answer is negative, as likely,
what can be done about it? These are the most difficult questions with which
the Convention on the Future of Europe is struggling.
Two very different approaches are possible, and two camps have formed in
this debate. One possibility is to transfer more executive powers to the Com-
mission, while at the same time “politicising” the Commission by imposing
more democratic control over its appointment. The opposite approach is to
reinforce the Council, increasing its ability to co-ordinate national policies and
provide public goods.
The second approach (the so called inter-governmental method) is the least
traumatic and more likely to be pursued in the end. One important idea, sug-
gested by political leaders in France and the UK, is to replace the rotating six
months Presidency of the Council with a stronger President elected by all EU
leaders for several years. The new President would be the official representa-Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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tive of Europe abroad (replacing the position currently filled by Javier Solana),
and would act as the agenda setter for the Council in developing defence and
foreign policies with a European perspective. This approach would have the
merit of leaving these sensitive policy areas firmly in the hands of Member
States, while at the same time providing new instruments for tighter and more
effective policy co-ordination.
But there are also several drawbacks. First, it is unlikely that the limits of pol-
icy co-ordination would be overcome. The incentives of national political
leaders to differentiate themselves from the others or to signal their compe-
tence to voters at home are just too strong. Each government will want to show
that it is pursuing the national interest, or seek to claim credit for EU policy
successes. A unified and effective foreign policy would likely remain an elu-
sive goal.
Second, the EU would continue to rely on national bureaucracies for public
good provision. But, as argued above, lack of verifiability implies that the free
rider problems would not be addressed. The Commission, not the Council, is
traditionally the bureaucratic arm of the EU. The Council cannot adequately
monitor the effort and the resources that each government devotes to perform
the common tasks in, say, internal or external security, or to exchange infor-
mation collected by national diplomacies. As a result, each country will con-
tinue to free ride on the others.
A third important problem with this approach is that the Commission would
loose power of initiative and its role could be reduced to that of a “Secretariat”
of the Council. This is negative because the Commission is also the “Guardian
of the Treaty”. A less powerful Commission may not be able to enforce the
Single Market against recalcitrant Member States, to ban state aid, to impose
budgetary discipline on myopic governments, to negotiate effectively with
foreign countries over trade policy or other aspects of common economic poli-
cies. The EU (perhaps) would become stronger in some areas, but it could
become much weaker in others.
Finally, it is not obvious that strengthening the Council in this way would
increase democratic legitimacy and accountability. On the one hand, the Coun-
cil President would be appointed, not directly elected. European citizens would
remain suspicious of the closed door negotiations that led to his appointment.
On the other hand, there remains the “bundling” problem: national govern-
ments will still be judged mainly for what they do at home, not for their Euro-
pean policies. Thus, we would still lack an instrument of democratic control to
correct possible mistakes in European policies, or to express the voters’ dis-
satisfaction with the conduct of European affairs.Guido Tabellini
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The alternative approach is to transfer some executive powers to the Commis-
sion, but then to increase its political accountability. This is the approach most
likely to be favoured by the smaller European Member States (who fear being
emarginated in the Council), by several representatives in the European Par-
liament, and perhaps by the Commission itself.
The Commission recently formulated some proposals to the Convention that
go in this direction (Commission, 2002a). The idea is to extend the traditional
Community method to new areas: to strengthen the position of the Commis-
sioner for External Relations, merging its functions with those of the High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (Javier Solana) and
exploiting this single position for external representation of Europe; to rein-
force the Commission initiative over foreign and security policy; to provide
new human and budgetary resources for a common foreign policy and for
security policy; to abandon unanimity rule in the realm of foreign policy
(though not of defence). These are bold proposals that would enable effective
public good provision in these areas, but which will be fiercely contested by
national governments. Their merit is just the other side of the weaknesses of
the intergovernmental approach: the Commission would be reinforced, a Euro-
pean bureaucracy would be revamped, initiative would be unified and taken by
a body who cares about European interests and not national interests.
Surprisingly however, these bold proposals by the Commission were not ac-
companied by an acknowledgement that the Commission itself needs to be-
come more democratically accountable. Acquiring such strong executive pow-
ers from national governments would be unthinkable without some form of
democratic control over the Commission.
But here is where the difficulties arise. So far the Commission has been a by-
partisan and largely technical body. Preserving this feature is important if the
Commission is to remain an effective “Guardian of the Treaty”. But how can
the Commission become more democratically accountable without also be-
coming more partisan?
A possible compromise, advocated by some commentators, is to reverse some
aspects of the current procedure for appointing the Commission (Padoa
Schioppa, 2002). Rather than the Council nominating the President of the
Commission and the European Parliament confirming it, the opposite could
take place. The Parliament elects the President after each European election
(so that citizens vote at European Parliamentary elections knowing who the
alternative candidates for President are). And the Council by qualified majority
then confirms the Parliament’s choice. To preserve by-partisanships, the rest of
the Commission could then be appointed as now by the Council and the Presi-
dent, and confirmed by the Parliament. Alternatively, and more radically, thePrinciples of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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Commission President could be directly elected by European citizens (rather
than by the Parliament).
Understanding the tradeoffs between these alternative methods (or others) for
increasing the democratic accountability of the Commission is important.
Certainly more ideas and proposals will be put forward in the ongoing debate
on the Future of Europe. But the crucial question in the end will be whether
European citizens have enough in common to develop tighter forms of political
oversight of their common policies, or whether instead language and cultural
barriers are so strong that, at least for now, the intergovernmental method is
the only safe approach.
5 What compromise?
It is very difficult to predict what will come out of the current process of re-
form. But some compromises are inevitable. There are two main dividing lines
in the ongoing debate. One pits the advocates of centralisation against the
advocates of subsidiarity. The other concerns the contrast between the Inter-
governmental method and the Community method. These two divisions are
correlated, though not identical. Many issues are on the table, and many differ-
ent compromises are possible. Some would be highly desirable, others could
be disastrous.
September 11 and the recent events in the Middle East have increased the
demand for a more effective “external Europe” and stronger European respon-
sibilities in internal and external security. A shift towards more public good
provision at the European level seems likely, though the institutional form that
this could take is still highly uncertain. As argued above, this shift would be
highly desirable.
But in the name of finding a compromise and avoiding a European Superstate,
something else might have to go in the opposite direction: from Bruxelles back
to the national capitals. In the previous pages we argued that this opportunity
should be seized to reform the redistributive programs of the Union: mainly
CAP and the Structural Funds. This would make it easier to rationalise current
financial arrangements: the EU budget would be devoted to providing public
goods and could be financed by a specific European tax. Redistribution could
mainly or exclusively be directed to assist the new accession countries and
provide side payments to compensate the countries who would be net losers
from agricultural reform.
This compromise on task allocation (more public good provision but less re-
distribution at the European level), could take place while also strengtheningGuido Tabellini
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the role of the Commission. The Commission could become the agenda setter
and the enforcer for public good provision, as the Community method is ex-
tend to the second and third pillars (foreign policy, home affairs, internal and
external security). And its enforcement powers over the single market could be
strengthened. As argued above, however, a more powerful Commission would
also have to become more democratically accountable to European citizens at
large, not just to the governments in the Council. We would move towards a
more federal Europe in some dimensions, while also stepping back from the
danger of a European Superstate, concretely and not just with empty rhetoric.
But another compromise is possible and politically much more palatable: to
keep the current redistributive programs alive and kicking, and instead to scale
back the enforcement of the Single Market. This would leave national politi-
cians more free to pursue their national goals in the name of subsidiarity. It
would also avoid the political costs of hurting the current beneficiaries of
European redistribution.
This scenario on task allocation would naturally go hand in hand with an over-
all weaker Commission. Governments would be in charge of public good pro-
vision in foreign and security policy, and the Council would be strengthened −
the intergovernmental approach. Public good provision would rely on policy
co-ordination, and would probably be less effective. The Commission would
be much less influential in all dimensions, including in its roles of “Guardian
of the Treaty” and enforcer of the single market. In the short run some hard
choices and some risks could be avoided. But the medium run result could be a
serious step back, with new trade barriers, distortion of market forces, and less
effective public good provision.
The main challenge for the Convention on the Future of Europe is to influence
events so that the first, better, compromise in the end will be pursued.
How should tasks be divided between the EU and its member states? And what
institutional reforms are needed? This paper argues that the single market re-
mains to be better enforced, and this might require further centralisation of
tasks. On the other hand, EU meddling with redistribution should be scaled
back; this would imply reducing EU intervention in agricultural policy, struc-
tural funds and the social charter. EU tasks should instead be expanded outside
the first pillar, namely in foreign and defence policies, internal security, immi-
gration. The paper ends by discussing what institutional reforms are needed to
accompany this allocation of tasks.Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective
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